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Abstract— Failures in robotics can have disastrous conse-
quences that worsen rapidly over time. This, the ability to rely
on robotic systems, depends on our ability to monitor them
and intercede when necessary, manually or autonomously. Prior
work in this area surveys intrusion detection and security chal-
lenges in robotics, but a discussion of the more general anomaly
detection problems is lacking. As such, we provide a brief
insight-focused discussion and frameworks of thought on some
compelling open problems with anomaly detection in robotic
systems. Namely, we discuss non-malicious faults, invalid data,
intentional anomalous behavior, hierarchical anomaly detection,
distribution of computation, and anomaly correction on the fly.
We demonstrate the need for additional work in these areas
by providing a case study which examines the limitations of
implementing a basic anomaly detection (AD) system in the
Robot Operating System (ROS) 2 middleware. Showing that
if even supporting a basic system is a significant hurdle, the
path to more complex and advanced AD systems is even more
problematic. We discuss these ROS 2 platform limitations to
support solutions in robotic anomaly detection and provide
recommendations to address the issues discovered.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection (AD) is an increasingly important area
of study in the field of robotics as robotic systems tend
towards higher levels of autonomy. Being able to predict,
identify, and correct these anomalies is critical, especially
when the robotic systems can have a direct or indirect impact
on human life. Unfortunately, while all versions of anomaly
detection seek to identify things that are anomalous, there is
still considerable variation in precisely what this means:
1) Extreme: The point lies above a threshold t.
2) Isolated: In some metric space, the distance to other
points is greater than t except for at most n of other
very nearby points (a point at the center of a highly
bimodal distribution can be isolated and not extreme).
3) Abnormal (or inconsistent with a trusted model): As
an example, an auditor keeps track of the ratio of
total income to total taxes paid for a collection of
organizations. One organization is far larger than the
others, with income and taxes being both extremely
high. However, the ratio of taxes to income for this
large organization is comparable to the ratio for smaller
organizations, and the auditor considers it normal.
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Thus, a point can be both extreme and/or isolated and
yet still fail to be abnormal.
The differences between the senses above are conceptually
superficial. For any space containing an isolated point, there
exists a simple transformation of the space that results in the
isolated point becoming an extreme value. Similarly, the size
(in terms of income and taxes) of an organization is really
a distraction if the ratio of income to taxes is what matters,
so why not just talk about that ratio? Unfortunately, while
these kinds of conceptual connections between competing
notions of anomalousness are trivial for simple examples,
they become less trivial as the dimension of the space grows.
The anomaly detection task is especially challenging when
we are asked to treat the data as a black box, with no a priori
insight into what is “normal”. A general-purpose anomaly
detection algorithm will require considerable sophistication
to automatically notice the relationship between income and
taxes without any prior knowledge of finance. Accordingly,
varying techniques of anomaly detection in robotic monitor-
ing focus on predefined relationships of what is a “normal
range” of operation [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], however, as we show
in this work, there are still several open problems in robotic
anomaly detection that significantly degrade the assumption
of being able to define that “normal range”.
Finally, we demonstrate the need for additional work in
these areas by providing a case study which examines the
limitations of implementing a basic anomaly detection (AD)
system in the Robot Operating System (ROS) 2 middle-
ware [6], which is an attempt to revise and improve many
engineering decisions from the ROS 1 platform [7]. ROS
has often been difficult to work with and requires specific
engineering guidelines which are not conducive to real-time
anomaly detection. Accordingly, we draw the conclusion that
if even supporting a basic system is a significant hurdle, the
path to more complex and advanced AD systems is even
more problematic. We discuss these ROS 2 platform limita-
tions to support solutions in robotic anomaly detection and
provide recommendations to address the issues discovered.
II. OPEN PROBLEMS WITH REGARDS TO ROBOTIC AD
SYSTEMS
A. Non-malicious faults present many false alarms.
False positives and false negatives have been well studied
in AD and intrusion detection systems [8], [9], [10]. It
is a long-held belief that an anomaly means a failure of
a system directly. However, not all anomalies represent
failures. A robot can behave anomalously frequently without
ever failing, resulting in a large amount of false alarms that,
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in turn, results in operator overload and cognitive burden.
Alarmingly, high false-alarm rates lead to lowered operator
trust in robots [11].
A big issue with false alarms is that being able to handle
them means that we have a priori information that a given
alarm is a false positive, meaning the alarm should not have
occurred in the first place. There are not many methods to
eliminate false alarms beyond creating methods with better
sensitivity and specificity. The current dominant method to
handle operator burden due to these false alarms relies on
alarm rate thresholding [12]. Tweaking the threshold at which
an alarm persists on the operator’s alert panel, in practice,
allows many false alarms to be handled at the cost of
tuning this subjective parameter and possibly suppressing
one-off true alarms. Methods to dynamically change the
threshold exist [13], but they are brittle and are still prone
to suppressing true alarms. A proposed method of handling
false alarms is by using a pseudo human-in-the-loop (HITL)
approach, in which all alerts are initially presented to the
operator. As the operator dismisses alerts, a simple model
can learn the operator’s preferences and subsequently use
the feedback to suppress false alarms, or alarms that the
operator deems unnecessary. Approaches like these have
been explored in security contexts [14] but have yet to be
seriously applied in robotics contexts.
It is infeasible to handle non-malicious faults as it is
impossible to know ahead of time which faults are non-
malicious. Since the idea of which alert is alarming is
subjective based on the situation and the operator, HITL
approaches present a dynamic and robust way to handle alerts
related to non-malicious faults. HITL systems need further
interest and development with regard to AD systems.
B. When is invalid data anomalous, and when is it not?
Conceptually, one can separate the data ingestion pipeline
into three parts: 1) the sensor, which is the source of the
data, 2) the data processing pipeline, which does the initial
data transformation/cleaning, and 3) the data interpretation
pipeline, which provides meaning to the data in the context
of the overall robotic system (often the data processing and
interpretation pipelines are merged, but a distinction still
exists). It is often the case that the beginning stage of the
pipeline (the sensor) may be operating without anomalies
but returning data that is “invalid” from the standpoint of
the remaining parts of the pipeline that is interpreting the
data or monitoring a user. In this case, it is hard to say that
invalid data is “anomalous.”
There are two schools of thought on this matter:
1) The data is never anomalous, but the interpretations
are.
2) The data can be flawed given a static interpretation
framework.
The former, data-purist school of thought is compelling
because it conditions us to replace human senses and intu-
ition with robotic ones such that the available sensors and
all their data (invalid or not) are the ground truth. Similar
to an instance where a human believes they saw a UFO, the
data itself (the light collected by the eyes) is always valid,
but frameworks of interpretation (the way the brain processes
the light collected by the eyes) may be incorrect or behave
in anomalous fashions. In this model, the AD burden falls
to the data interpretation pipeline.
The latter school of thought is arguably more practical
because it allows the engineer to define limits on the nor-
malcy of data. Imagine a use case where a LiDAR sensor is
collecting point cloud data to map its surrounding region. A
splash of water from a passing car covers the sensor for a few
seconds. In this perspective, the data from the sensor needs
to be ignored as valid data because the sensor’s operations
are compromised. The AD burden in thsi scenario lies with
the data processing pipeline.
Overall, invalid data cannot be directly correlated with
anomalous behavior, though a correlation certainly exists.
It is essential when building AD systems to take a softer
stance towards invalid data and provide methods to filter
it out without triggering alarms about anomalous behavior.
Methods to filter invalid data vary [15], [16], [17], and
there is no one right way to approach this problem. Robust
sensor and domain-specific filtering methods need to be
generalizable to handle unforeseen edge cases.
It is also important to consider that anomalous states
are, again, often defined as some deviation from a typical
behavior trend. This “normalcy” carries with it the idea that
there are base assumptions about operation, environment,
and intended behavior. That is, if there is some function
F that defines normal behavior, it is only valid under a
set of assumptions A. Current robotic AD systems do not
monitor A, even if A is prone to change. For example, a
robotic system that is meant to only operate on flat, 2D
surfaces must suddenly operate on a 2D plane that exists on
a slope. The base assumptions for this robotic system have
changed, and this state should be detected as an anomaly.
While this change in base assumptions may have an effect
on the overall operation of the robot and still can be detected
via the classical, deviation from F definition of anomalous
behavior, it is sometimes more effective to capture changes
in A.
By neglecting to account for the ever-changing set of
assumptions about the environment, current robotic AD
systems are severely lacking in their ability to handle the
dynamic environments that current robotics research focuses
on. In order to reason about changes in A, we must reason
about the environment with a non-static framework of “nor-
malcy.” As robotic systems progress further into autonomous
operation in unconstrained environments, future AD systems
will need to capture changes in A, which will require new
ideas and research into unreliable surroundings.
C. Intentional anomalous behavior and emergency stops
Robotics failures are far from monolithic. Some failures
are internal, as when a part breaks or when an algorithm fails
to anticipate a logical outcome. Some failures are external,
when the power grid stops powering the robot or an operator
drives the robot over a cliff. And some failures have no
Fig. 1. Example of some arbitrary operation envelope OE
simple blame prescription. An operator and a robot may
jointly confuse each other; a robot may stumble into an
environment for which it was not designed to be successful;
or an operator may push the robot to the edge of its limits
in a completely rational act of desperation.
In order to characterize intentional anomalous behavior
and how to apply emergency stops in particularly alarming
cases, we must return to forming a definition of normal
operating conditions with respect to the explicit physical
bounds of the robotic system. Examples include the amount
of weight an arm can lift, degrees of rotation, and the speed at
which something can operate. We can imagine these bounds
as a closed curve in some operation envelope. As a safety
measure, most robots are rated to perform outside their
normal operating conditions.
For some N -dimensional set of all possible operating con-
ditions OE, where each dimension represents an operating
attribute (weight, rotation, etc.), we have N ⊆ FOS ⊆ OE,
where N is the subset of operating conditions that fall within
normal operating bounds and FOS represents the subset of
operating conditions that take into account some Factor of
Safety (FoS). FOS{ = FOS \ OE represents the set of
operating conditions that are outside of the FoS and are not
accounted for by the engineers of the system.
Given some state φ ∈ OE, when can one say that it
represents anomalous physical behavior? Certainly if φ ∈ N ,
then φ is not anomalous. On the other hand, if φ is very much
outside the bounds of FOS, then it is anomalous. There
exists this gray area in between. When φ is outside of FOS
by some small margin, it may not necessarily be anomalous,
yet when the margin is appreciable then the probability
that the state is anomalous increases. An example here is
redlining a car. Redlining by itself may not be anomalous
behavior; however, the probability of identifying that state
as anomalous increases as we maintain the redline.
Assume that there exists a risk surface outside the bounds
of FOS. The risk surface defines how “risky” any φ is as
it moves further from FOS. In the case of robotics, it is
necessarily true that the steepness of the risk surface and
the “distance” (for some abstract, non-continuous definition
of distance) away from FOS is directly correlated. This
risk surface is more often than not unknown since OE
is generally high-dimensional and many configurations are
untested. Therefore, while some of the risk surface may be
defined via explicit testing, a large portion of it must be
learned or inferred. A risk model then defines a function
over the risk surface that quantifies the amount of risk
present in any given φ. It is important to state that a risk
model may either be explicitly defined via rigorous testing
if OE is small, but will have to be learned if OE is of any
sizable cardinality (as in the case of autonomous driving, for
example).
Once we have a quantified view of the “riskiness” of
a state, we can then create an AD system by integrating
time and count components to see how long or how often
a risky state is maintained. Using either thresholding or a
learned cut-off, it is then feasible — and most importantly,
explainable — to trigger emergency stops at relevant times
in the robotic system’s execution.
Intentional anomalous behavior is currently not well un-
derstood. As such, autonomous emergency stops are difficult
to calculate and execute. It is imperative to define risk models
ahead of time that can give scales of confidence with which
to implement emergency stops; defining risk models in this
is manner currently under-explored.
D. AD systems built around hierarchies of systems with
shared functionality
Common systems fail in similar fashions. For example,
autonomous room cleaners have a shared mode of failure
in that they may localize incorrectly, or different types of
load bearing arms get stressed on common joints. There-
fore, instead of building AD systems that are sensitive
to each sensor and actuator, it is possible to create an
ontology/hierarchy of sensors and actuators to simplify the
AD burden. Such approaches have been explored [18] and
demonstrate significant improvement in AD capability, but
rely on explicitly defined groupings which may not exist in
a robotics use-case. Most systems in a robotic platform are
not fundamentally unique and failures on these systems do
not need to be finely monitored. By clustering their behavior
together and focusing on a subset of their messages features
that are shared across these systems, we can reduce the
number of topics a robotic AD system must focus on. This
reduces computation load and operator burden, as tailored
alerts for each system are no longer provided for non-critical
systems.
Robotic systems can be described via their information-
processing aspects terms in of a graph structure:
• a collection of k nodes V = {v1, ..., vk}, where some
nodes are connected by directed edges E = {(vi, vj)}
variously representing physical anchoring, energy flow,
or information flow of various kinds,
• the graph is defined as G = (V,E),
• and all nodes are loyal to some pre-defined objective
(at least implicitly, by design).
However, in order to discuss shared functionality, commu-
nication graphs are not an ideal representation. An alternate
definition of a robotic system that may be more conducive
is as follows:
• a collection of k nodes V = {v1, ..., vk}, where nodes
are connected by directed edges E = {(vi, vj)} repre-
senting one-way communication channels,
• the graph is defined as G = (V,E),
• nodes can be grouped in the form of {vx|f(vx)} ∃vx ∈
C, where f(x) represents a predicate function that
returns true if vx has a certain functionality, and C
represents the overall set of all groups in the robotic
system,
• and vx is a member of only one subset of C
It is easy to imagine a sub-component of a robotic system
as a monolith; if we can abstract away the finer details (e.g.,
imagine the combination of a robotic “wrist” and “elbow”
as just a robotic “arm”) then we can reduce cognitive and
computational burden. We call this ability to view things as
a simple hierarchy composability — the ability to compose
items together into a higher-level merger of objects. Let
the behavior of nodes V be denoted by B = [b1, ..., bk],
where |B| = |V |. Let there also be a vector of constants
Φ = [α1, ..., αk], |Φ| = |B|. Linear composability is then
defined by ΦT · B = α1b1 + ... + αkbk. This necessarily
means that the behavior of each node is independent from the
behavior of other nodes, which means that this composition
is decomposable.
Attributes of nodes that are linearly composable are well-
suited to hierarchical treatment. However, most robotic at-
tributes are not inherently decomposable. For example, the
dynamics of a robotic “arm” is a non-linear composition
of the “wrist” and “elbow”. The dynamics on the wrist
interact with the elbow in a dependent fashion. Thus, there is
sizable information lost when treating both components as
one hierarchy. However, attributes such as individual CPU
load can easily be treated as one hierarchy for AD purposes.
There are many gains to be had by abstracting the AD
burden into hierarchies of systems, but there is not a clear
understanding of what systems can be treated as a group.
We present a minimal framework of thought with which to
tackle this problem; however, there is not sufficient literature
in this area to make definitive conclusions about the merit
of this approach.
E. Distribution of computation across hosts
Anomaly detection algorithms sometimes require com-
plex computation that may not be possible on many robot
platforms due to limited computational resources. With the
prevalence of network connected devices, it is possible
to distribute computation to nodes that possess sufficient
resources to run computation and send results back to the
robot platform.
Distributed computation will be the cornerstone of robotics
in the future. With the large amount of sensor, log, and
systems data that can be collected and generated by robotic
systems, it will become infeasible to provide enough com-
putation on one system to process all the data in a timely
manner, especially with regard to AD systems.
There are many well-established methods to distribute
computation. To this point, we will discuss three main
architectures we believe are especially pertinent to robotics:
peer-based, hub-and-spoke, and local reduction with a hub.
Fig. 2. Notional peer-to-peer architecture
Peer-based computation is a model that relies on all peers
in a network performing computation together in order to
quickly solve a given task. Many such models have been
explored [19], [20], [21], but the central idea is that some
function F can be passed to all nodes in a system, and then
some data X can be processed by all nodes with results
broadcast to all peers. Additional overhead is optional if
results need to be merged locally. Alternatively, nodes can be
assigned unique functions to compute and a pipeline can be
created across nodes, such that no one system is responsible
for all the work. In robotic AD systems, the peer-to-peer
approach is viable as the AD computation could feasibly be
passed around to nodes that are not actively utilizing their
computational resources with the benefits being relayed to
the entire system. Furthermore, a single node going out of
contention does not harm the overall system. This approach
has been explored [22], [23], but present many limitations,
such as network flow problems associated with a slow peer,
protocol issues, and more.
Fig. 3. Notional hub-and-spoke architecture
Hub-and-spoke (often called server/client architecture)
models are simple: all computation is offloaded to a cen-
tral server. The server receives the data, processes it, and
returns results to all the “spokes” (nodes), ad infinitum. This
removes the burden of computation from the robotic system
entirely, which means that robots can be deployed with less
computational power than otherwise necessary. This is ideal
when AD systems have to deal with massive amounts of data.
This idea has been widely embraced by the field of “cloud
robotics”, for which [24] and [25] give a good background.
This method, however, introduces multiple modes of failure,
such as loss of autonomy when there is a loss of signal,
computation server failures, and more.
Fig. 4. Notional local reduction with hub-and-spoke architecture
An extension of the hub-and-spoke architecture to reduce
the computation load on the central hub is to introduce the
concept of local reduction. Each robotic system or compo-
nent can perform local computation within the bounds of its
computational resources by itself, and then pass intermediate
results to the hub, where it can process further with lower
computational load. This is an exciting model, as robots can
already process their data comfortably, so an AD system can
still process massive amounts of data with less computational
load across the entire system.
The central problem that needs to be addressed is that of
autonomy vs. computation. By relying on systems outside of
the robotic system itself, the robot loses autonomy. It now
must account for communication failures, node dropouts, and
countless other errors that could cause it to no longer have
the ability to perform some computation. On the other hand,
by allowing for distributed computation, the robotic system
gains the ability to process more data than it can by itself.
These trade-offs are critical and may vastly differ based on
use case. Graceful degradation of communication abilities or
node failures need to be studied in detail, as the fundamental
operations of a robotic system must be maintained even when
all distributed computation loads go awry.
For many existing and emerging robotic use cases, such as
manufacturing or self-driving vehicles, distributed computa-
tion of AD computations will allow for the greatest flexibility
in anomaly detection, correction, and recovery procedures.
F. Fixing anomalies on the fly
Once anomalies have been identified, many systems do
not take much action beyond providing the operator or the
log with an alert that can be manually corrected, if the
operator deems it fit. However, with autonomous systems, it
is essential that automatic correction of errors and anomalous
behavior be integrated as a component or extension of an
AD system. Flight control systems include fault-tolerance
and error correction as one of their core components [26]
A way of introducing fault tolerance into systems is to
run multiple versions of the same system simultaneously
and switch between the systems if anomalous behavior is
detected. This method has been explored for visual odometry
[27] and in other fields, such as optimization and distributed
computing [28]. This method is successful but computa-
tionally inefficient, as computation would increase with a
complexity of Ω(N) with respect to the number of redundant
systems.
Non-blocking snapshots [29] of critical systems during pe-
riods in which no anomalous behavior is occurring constitute
an alternative way of fixing anomalous behavior or errors
within various systems. By reverting to a snapshot that is
known to work, the system can recover from anomalous
behavior, and may even avoid falling back to its anoma-
lous state given that the initial anomaly was caused via
non-deterministic causes. The downside to this is that the
system may be stuck in a snapshot-recovery cycle if there
is a deterministic and reproducible cause that the system is
facing.
A middle ground to non-blocking snapshots and running
multiple copies of a system is the concept of shadow
computing and shadow replication [30], in which a process is
duplicated with shadow processes. These shadow processes
are an exact replica of the main process but are executed at a
lower quality of service (QoS). In robotics, mission-critical
software and hardware drivers can be shadow replicated,
and upon the detection of anomalous behavior due to a
non-deterministic fault, a healthy shadow process can be
substituted. The anomalous process can then be shadowed
and restarted as needed.
Robotic systems can also learn to correct anomalous
behavior and incorporate error correction into various algo-
rithms in the overall system. This approach is explored in the
context of planning [31], map learning [32], and many other
application domains [33], [34], [35]. Better error correction
is a topic of active research in many fields [36], [37], [38]. A
truly global method of error correction is out of scope given
current technology since the combined dimensionality of all
systems in a robot are too vast for learning algorithms to be
able to map.
In order to properly address these concerns, it is imperative
for anomaly correction to be seen as a basic research task
rather than an applied one. Furthermore, borrowing existent
research from other fields is critical, as a lot of fundamental
work already exists and needs to be adapted for the robotics-
specific domain. Finally, AD correction also needs to be
quantified in terms of operational risk, i.e., it is currently not
well understood how much the lack of anomaly correction
affects missions in terms of cost and resources.
III. MONITORING OUR OWN ROBOT: A CASE STUDY
We implemented a basic AD system in ROS 2 to demon-
strate the need for more work in examining robotic AD
systems. Due to the popularity and decisions behind the
ground-up redesign of ROS 2 [6], we show that basic
architectural constraints to implementing a real-time AD
system reinforce the conclusion that supporting future AD
systems is currently not possible without changes to the
system.
The platform we chose for implementation is the Turtlebot
21, which is a low-cost, open-source robot that provides a
framework on which to build. Traditionally, the Turtlebot
2 runs on ROS. Efforts have been made2 to run ROS 2
on the base, but they largely rely on the ROS 1 bridge.
Nevertheless, it provides us a target to start developing new
ROS 2 technologies.
A. Control
Tele-operation (tele-op) is a common way to control robots
in many environments. In order to support full tele-op for the
Turtlebot on ROS 2, we created a ROS 2 node that allows an
Xbox controller to be used to control all degrees of motion
for the Kobuki base.
• This is a complete ROS 2 rclpy implementation and
does not rely on the ROS 1 bridge.
• Both publishing and subscription occur in the same
node to listen to Joy messages and send messages to
/cmd_vel.
B. Capturing Messages
We explored two methods to capture the messages pub-
lished on topics in the ROS system. Both methods have their
upsides and downsides. For the sake of modularity, we focus
only on the upsides here and capture the limitations later.
1) We created an rclpy ROS 2 node that would auto-
matically subscribe to all the topics in the system and
write their messages to disk.
• We can debug messages in real-time with existent
Python tooling.
• New topics can be subscribed to on the fly without
modifying the ROS environment.
• The behavior of the topic collector can be changed
on the fly by publishing messages to it.
• Can be extended to perform actions on the ROS 2
system in real-time.
2) Using rosbag over the ROS 1 bridge.
• Use existent ROS infrastructure without having to
reinvent the wheel.
• Easy tooling to analyze and simulate rosbag
files.
Both methods give us files that we can interpret as a
chronological feed of the robot’s operation, which we can
analyze and perform actions on. Of the two, Method 1 is
preferred since we can perform actions immediately when
we detect an anomaly. However, as we will see later, there
are significant limitations with ROS 2 to make this a reality.
C. A basic AD system
Our data consists of timestamps for every message passed
by each node in the system. A single data point is a sensor-
timestamp pair, down to the millisecond. For intuition to
1https://www.turtlebot.com/turtlebot2/
2https://github.com/ros2/turtlebot2 demo
drive our AD model, consider that we may define many
different metrics or features from the data. Surprising values
or combinations of values for any of these metrics could
suggest the presence of anomalies:
• Rate of messages per topic or across all topics
• Rate of messages per time, day of the week, etc.
• Autocorrelation of messages: How often does a message
of one type tend to follow a message of another type
within a particular time-lag window?
IV. RESULTS
In order to test our basic AD system, we ran the Turtlebot
along specified paths, injecting behaviors such as jerky di-
rection changes, controller disconnects, counter-intuitive path
following, and varying speeds. Each path was tested with a
random combination of all behavior modifications multiple
times. The basic AD system performed reasonably well,
capturing anomalies 70% of the time. Due to limitations,
discussed below, we were unable to verify how the AD
system would react after correcting any observed anomalies
in the behavior.
While building utilities to capture messages and a real-
time AD system, we encountered several limitations with
ROS 2, the most pressing of which we enumerate here.
1) A node that is solely a Subscriber gets no results from
get_topic_names_and_types() in class Node.
In order to get all topic names and types, the node must
also be a Publisher.
2) There are no easily available API methods to access
the underlying ROS 2 DDS implementation (eProsima
RTPS) that we could find for the Python interface.
3) Writing messages to disk using the all-subscriber node
(Method 1, III-B) causes system hangups and dropped
messages in the pub-sub queues. This is a significant
hurdle to real-time AD systems.
4) rosbag cannot listen to new topics if they appear
after the command to launch rosbag is executed.
5) There is no simple utility to convert rosbags to
formats such as JSON, YAML, CSV, and Protobufs.
Data scientists may not have the easiest time handling
the rosbag API, but their toolkits already support the
listed formats.
Auxiliary limitations that were faced included the lack of
good documentation for many basic ROS 2 tasks, an ever-
changing development environment, and hard-to-find com-
munity support for the platform. We expect these problems
to be solved naturally as ROS 2 matures as a platform.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ROS 2
The decentralized (by default) graph structure of a ROS
2 robot sets it apart from its predecessor, as explained in
[6]. The design of ROS 2 allows for easier development,
faster and more understandable inter-node communication
dynamics, and a closer alignment to the ideal “pub-sub”
design architecture. However, this decentralization of ROS
2 raises questions about the available goals of an AD system
implemented in ROS 2. As described in Section IV, the
current design and implementation of ROS 2 prove to be a
hindrance to simple, non-real-time AD applications. In order
to be future-facing and to handle the open problems outlined
in Section II, ROS 2 must evolve and implement some
alterations to its design specification. Our recommendations
relate to optimizing the design of ROS 2 to enable advanced
and future AD methods to operate most effectively. The basis
for our recommendations is a first-principles analysis, as
there is not much of an open-source precedent for AD in
robotics, and particularly not one for ROS 2.
The following are the core ingredients that we see as
necessary for a successful AD system on a robot:
1) Data: Sensor data of all kinds are the fundamental
inputs to AD algorithms. If real-time AD is needed,
real-time data must be collected. If OS temperature is
an important indicator of a near-future node malfunc-
tion, temperature data must be collected.
2) Data transport/centralization: Specifically, any node
running AD software needs to have data feeds from
all other nodes or processes that are relevant for the
targeted class of anomalies. This introduces a commu-
nication overhead cost.
3) Computational nodes: Once all data relevant for
anomaly detection is being supplied to a central node,
the challenge becomes how to derive insight from it.
In general, such analysis is computationally costly. To
maintain a strong AD capability on a complex robot,
ROS needs to support large compute nodes.
Given these core ingredients, we make the following
recommendations for ROS 2 based on our findings:
1) Introduce strict value ranges into messages (II-B).
• Messages define what data a listener can accept,
but the listener considers only a set range of values
valid for any given field. When values out of this
range are received, the listener can error out.
• Listeners must implement their own range-
checking, which is a hurdle and can often be
poorly managed.
• A message type with built-in range checks can be
denied on the publisher’s side before the listener
ever has to interact with it.
2) Provide automatic subscription to new topics and mes-
sages in rosbag (III-B).
• In order to build a real-time AD system, we need
to be able to detect when nodes enter and leave the
system. In its current form, and its new proposed
design [6], rosbag cannot detect when a node
creates a new topic or an existent one is removed.
• Having a utility that can track the dynamism in
node publishing behavior is critical, especially
during a node crash.
3) Develop a better profiling environment
• In order to understand the system and to collect
valuable diagnostic data, a robust profiling envi-
ronment needs to exist within the ROS ecosystem.
• Currently, many people rely on language specific
profiling tools, the /statistics topic, and self-
created packages to collect system data.
4) Integrate best-known-state tracking and recovery (II-F)
• There are no ways to backup the state of a node
and to restore it to a given point, a method which
can quickly resolve many issues with an node
without resorting to a complete restart.
• System snapshots in general can help with debug-
ging and profiling of performance.
5) Introduce state introspection (II-D, II-F)
• The ROS graph needs to be known and all states
need to be dynamically verified in order to build
and maintain a structure of hierarchy.
• Knowing the initial (or best) structure and state of
all nodes in the ROS system will provide a known
target from which to recover from.
6) Provide a safe mode (II-F)
• When nodes fail, it is essential that core function-
alities are still available.
• In a safe mode, basic functionalities will be pro-
vided to recover the robotic system, such as when
in tele-operation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recently, the NTSB and BEA [39], [40] filed reports that
discussed fatal accidents in autonomous systems on land and
in air due to improper edge case and anomaly handling by
autonomous components in both robotic systems. The reports
highlight how these robotic systems were unable to react
outside of well understood operating envelopes and unable
to alert their operators about their failures in meaningful
ways. These reports echos the necessity of understanding
the various issues in anomaly detection when deploying a
robotic so that spurious or intentional anomalous behavior
can be understood and handled before the resulting actions
are dangerous both to the robot and the objects around it.
As anomaly detection for robotic systems continues to
grow as a point of interest, upcoming robotics platforms
need to support these capabilities on a first-class basis.
Furthermore, it is clear that robotic anomaly detection is
still in its nascent stage. Much work needs to be done to
fully understand and handle anomalous behaviors in robotic
systems in order to achieve complete, trustworthy autonomy.
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